Seward. But this in all probability made no difference in the result.

On the 11th of April, General Beauregard sent to Major Anderson a formal demand for the surrender of Port Sumter, which the Major courteously, but decidedly, refused. But he said to Beauregard's aides, who brought him the summons, that he should be out of provisions in a few clays. In consequence of this remark, Beauregard offered not to attack him if he would state when he would evacuate the post, and would agree in the meantime to refrain from hostilities. To this last condition, however, Anderson could not agree, inasmuch as if the relieving force should make its appearance, he must, of course, be free to support it by his guns. Accordingly, at half-past four on the morning of the 12th of April, 1861, the Confederate batteries opened their fire. The bombardment continued without cessation till the next afternoon. The enemy's mortar-batteries soon rendered it too hazardous for Anderson, with his small garrison, to man the barbette guns, from which he had expected the most execution, and his fire was confined to the casemate guns, which did not do great damage. On the 18th the hot shot fired by the enemy ignited the barracks,[1] and for a time, put the magazine in serious peril. The officers

and men' behaved with the greatest coolness and heroism, and the fire was finally got under.

' Why Anderson, in anticipation of such an occurrence, had not, previous to the bombardment, levelled all his combustible buildings, is a qtiAtfipvfc' which has sometimes been asked. See . Greeley, 444. The rea$04 undoubtedly was that he had not men enough for such a task. ** TK© ta& was enormous, impracticable."—Major John Johnson, in a letter to thf writer.